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THE FUTURE OF SCOTTISH LABOUR LAW: RECONCEPTUALISATION AND MODERNISATION 
JAMES MURPHIE, Advocate1 AND Dr MICHELLE WELDON-JOHNS2 
 
Introduction 
The political landscape in Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom has undoubtedly 
changed following the Independence referendum in September 2014 and with that comes 
the possibility for legal change.  This was evident in the aftermath of the referendum with the 
Smith Commission and its subsequent recommendations.34 Prior to the new Scotland Act 
2016 being laid before the Westminster parliament,5 the landmark election results in May 
2015 saw the Scottish National Party (the SNP) elected to 56 out of the 59 Scottish seats at 
Westminster.  This, again, changed the political landscape and has been viewed by the SNP 
and, by extension the Scottish Government, as a mandate to propose further devolution of 
powers to Holyrood with the overarching aim of achieving full fiscal autonomy.6  One such 
proposal is the devolution of Employment and Equality laws, including laws relating to Trade 
Unions, Health and Safety at Work and the National Minimum Wage, to the Scottish 
Parliament.7  This proposal has received support from the Scottish Trades Union Congress 
(STUC), 8  and Citizen’s Advice Scotland has also advocated the further development of 
employment laws to address specifically Scottish issues, although they do not explicitly 
                                                          
1 James Murphie, Advocate (member of the Hastie Stable, Faculty of Advocates, Parliament House, Edinburgh); 
senior lecturer in law (part-time)at Abertay University.  
2 Dr Michelle Weldon-Johns, Lecturer in law at Abertay University. 
3 The Smith Commission, Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament (The Smith Commission, 2014). 
4 This is doubly the case in the light of the results of the UK referendum on membership of the EU held on 23rd 
June 2016, which resulted in an overall UK vote to leave the EU by a margin of 51.9% to 48.1%.  In Scotland, 
however, 62% of voters opted to remain in the EU and 38% voted to leave, compared with England where the 
result was 53.4% for leave and 46.6% for remain.  This result underlines the distinct nature of the political and 
cultural environments as between Scotland on the one hand, and England & Wales on the other. 
5 Scotland Act 2016 c.11 
6 Scottish Government, Beyond Smith – Scottish Government proposals for more powers for the Scottish 
Parliament (The Scottish Government, 2015), 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/constitution/publications/morepowersproposals [Accessed 4 July 2016]. 
7 Scottish Government, Beyond Smith – Scottish Government proposals for more powers for the Scottish 
Parliament (The Scottish Government, 2015), paras 6, 22-30 and 53-57. These proposals were also previously 
contained within various other SNP and Scottish Government documents: Scottish Government, More Powers 
for the Scottish Parliament (The Scottish Government, 2014), 25 and 31-32; SNP, Stronger for Scotland (SNP 
Manifesto, 2015), 11. 
8 STUC, Submission to the Smith Commission, (STUC, 2014), paras 3-4 and Appendix B. 
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recommend devolution in this area.9  While there are no current commitments from the UK 
Government to devolve any of these specific competences to the Scottish Parliament, it is 
clear that there is support for the notion that bespoke Scottish solutions should be adopted 
for labour law issues.  
Devolving such powers to the Scottish Parliament would not be an entirely novel 
concept for the UK, as employment rights are already devolved to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly.10  This does not negatively impact on the UK labour market as a whole, and enables 
Northern Ireland to maintain the protection of employment rights currently either 
abandoned or reformed by the UK government.11  Devolving similar powers to Scotland would 
equally enable the Scottish Parliament to take its own decisions regarding key labour law 
changes.  It should be noted that there were specific political, geographical and economic 
factors within Northern Ireland that influenced their devolution settlement.12  However, that 
should not prevent, as a matter of principle, similar powers from now being devolved to 
Scotland, particularly as the political and economic policy positions, as well as attitudes 
towards industrial relations and labour law,13 are markedly different in Scotland from that of 
the rest of the UK. 
This paper focuses on the main proposal of devolving labour law and related 
competences to the Scottish Parliament and examines the issue of how, given the opportunity 
to do so, labour law might be redesigned in a Scottish context.  This analysis takes account of 
the distinct industrial relations partnership model that exists in Scotland, in particular 
between the Scottish Government and the STUC, encapsulated within their Memorandum of 
Understanding.14  In this regard, we argue that there are two main strands of divergence and 
potential areas for change where distinctly Scottish approaches could effectively be adopted.  
The first relates to the framework for dispute resolution, some aspects of which could fall 
                                                          
9 Citizens Advice Scotland, Fair Enough? Protecting Scotland’s workers from unfair treatment, (Citizens Advice 
Scotland, 2015). 
10 An overview of the transferred powers are available from Cabinet Office and Northern Ireland Office, 
Guidance, Devolution Settlement: Northern Ireland, (Cabinet Office and Northern Ireland Office, 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/devolution-settlement-northern-ireland [Accessed 4 July 2016]. 
11 As similarly argued by the STUC, Submission to the Smith Commission, (STUC, 2014), para 3, Appendix B, para 
3.2. 
12 As noted in the STUC, Submission to the Smith Commission, (STUC, 2014), Appendix B, para 3.1. 
13 As we explore further below 
14 Scottish Government and STUC, ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Scottish Government and the 
STUC’ (Scottish Government, 2015). 
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within the competence of the Scottish Parliament following the implementation of the 
Scotland Act 2016.15  The second is redesigning the industrial relations framework to create a 
clearer social partnership model which more closely reflects the mainstream European 
model.   
In analysing these potential areas for reform, comparisons will be drawn with other 
European countries, in particular the Republic of Ireland, a country very close to Scotland in 
terms of size, population, industry, trade and culture.  Before doing so, an analysis of the 
development of labour law in the UK will be provided, with a look forward to how this could 
be re-conceptualised in a Scottish context.  An overview will then be given of recent changes 
and issues in current UK labour law which could be addressed differently in a Scottish context, 
before examining the two key areas of proposed reform. 
 
Re-conceptualising Scottish Labour Law 
If competence over labour law were to be devolved to Scotland, the Scottish Parliament 
would be able to consider ways in which the nature, scope and content of Scottish labour law 
might be redesigned and the administrative framework, including dispute settlement, within 
which it would operate.  This would, firstly, require a reconsideration and re-
conceptualisation of labour law.  As Hepple previously noted, when referring to the demise 
of collective laissez-faire, ‘[a]n alternative labour law cannot be constructed out of nostalgia 
for those values.  It has to be grounded in a close analysis of the present and an understanding 
of the past’.16   Our analysis of the future of Scottish labour law must do the same.  With that 
in mind, it is useful to consider the position of previous UK Governments and the rationale 
underpinning the Scottish Government’s proposals for devolution, before offering a potential 
re-conceptualisation of Scottish labour law. 
                                                          
15 Scotland Act 2016 c.11, s.39.  Consultation on a Draft Order in Council for the Transfer of Specified Functions 
of the Employment Tribunal to the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland was published by the UK government in 
January 2016.  As presently drafted, the Order would transfer power to regulate Tribunal fees to the Scottish 
Parliament.  However, concerns have been expressed over the loss of the distinctive Employment Tribunal in 
favour of the transfer of functions to the First-tier Tribunal, possibly entailing the loss of specialist Employment 
Judges. 
16 Bob Hepple, ‘The Future of Labour Law’ (1995) 24 I.L.J. 303 at 305 
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Labour law in the UK has undergone significant periods of regulation and 
deregulation.17  A key part of this development of labour law has been a move from collective 
labour relations to individual employment rights, with trade unions having a much more 
marginal role.18  In the UK as a whole, it is the history of labour law that the concepts of 
collectivism and individualism sit as uncomfortably as incompatible spouses within the 
wedlock of the employment relationship.  From the collective laissez-faire of the 1960s-70s,19 
through the deregulation and growing political emphasis on individualism of the 1980s,20 it 
can be seen that each of them attempts to dominate the other, and each of them seeks to 
maintain their independence from the other without ever embracing the idea that two 
spouses become one couple.  The twin approaches of the UK state to industrial relations in 
the last 30 years has been to preserve the laissez-faire attitude of past eras in relation to 
collective bargaining whilst weakening the ability of trade unions to resort to industrial action 
as a weapon in the event of conflict.21  Dickens notes that even under New Labour ‘there was 
a reluctance to privilege collective voice over more individualised methods of conducting 
employment relations’.22 
However, individual rights have now also been eroded by the policies of the previous 
Conservative – Liberal Democrat Coalition government.  Under the Coalition, UK Labour 
Law was pulled in two directions, primarily de-regulatory under the influence of the 
Conservative ideology on the one hand, and regulatory to a more limited extent under the 
Liberal Democrat influence on the other.23  This reflects the aims underpinning their review 
                                                          
17 See Bob Hepple, ‘The Future of Labour Law’ (1995) 24 I.L.J. 303 and Bob Hepple, ‘Back to the Future: 
Employment Law under the Coalition Government’ (2013) 42 I.L.J. 203 for an overview of some of these shifts 
in UK labour law. 
18 P Smith and G Morton, ‘New Labour’s Reform of Britain’s Employment Law: The Devil is not only in the 
Detail but in the Values and Policy too’ (2001) 39 B.J.I.R. 119. 
19 Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (1977). 
20The twin policies of deregulation of industrial relations and strengthening of individualism have never been 
reversed, even during a Labour Government of 1997-2010 and were subsequently reinforced, firstly, by the 
Coalition Government 2010-2015 and again by the current Conservative administration elected in May 2015.  
For an overview of this see Linda Dickens, ‘The Coalition government’s reforms to employment tribunals and 
statutory employment rights – echoes of the past’ ( 2014) 45 I.R.J. 234 at 243. 
21 The focus of this paper is primarily on the issue of the collective bargaining framework rather than industrial 
action, therefore, there is no further discussion here of the latter issue. 
22 Linda Dickens, ‘The Coalition government’s reforms to employment tribunals and statutory employment 
rights – echoes of the past’ ( 2014) 45 I.R.J. 234 at 246. 




of Employment Law 24  which, Rodgers argues, mirrors both Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat ideals.25  In particular, it is underpinned by economic efficiency and freedom on the 
one hand, and fairness on the other.  These competing aims and perspectives illustrate the 
ongoing inherent tensions within the development of labour law.  Others, like Dickens, argue 
that the current reforms reflect those of the previous Conservative government and in that 
respect it is a revival of those ideals and many of their policies.26  The one key divergence from 
this ideology, and a reflection of Liberal Democrat policy, is the enactment of shared parental 
leave contained within the Shared Parental Leave Regulations 2014.27  However, the light-
touch and watered-down version of this right reflects the Conservative Party’s influence in 
this context too.28  This demonstrates the Coalition’s focus on the ‘minimum necessary’29 as 
opposed to the adoption of minimum standards.  
The resulting implications for labour law and those who rely upon it are, as Dickens 
notes, that ‘[w]orker protection as the objective of labour legislation, addressing the 
imbalance of power inherent in the employment relationship, has been displaced by 
regulation in the interest of a free market economy …’30  This is a significant consideration, 
particularly when viewed in the context of what Hepple describes as ‘what the founders of 
Labour Law regarded as its ‘special function’…’ which is ‘to ‘be the guardian of human beings 
in an age of unrestrained materialism.’31  This suggests that Labour Law has significantly 
moved away from its original objectives to instead better meet the needs and demands of 
employers.  If Labour Law were to be devolved to Scotland, the Scottish Parliament could 
                                                          
24 As originally noted in BIS, Flexible, effective, fair: promoting economic growth through a strong and efficient 
labour market (BIS, 2011), 2 and reiterated in subsequent literature on employment law reforms. 
25 Lisa Rodgers, ‘The UK Employment Law Review and Changes to Unfair Dismissal’ (2012) 1 E-Journal of 
International and Comparative Labour Studies 145 at 145. 
26 Linda Dickens, ‘The Coalition government’s reforms to employment tribunals and statutory employment 
rights – echoes of the past’ ( 2014) 45 I.R.J. 234 at 34-235. 
27 Shared Parental Leave Regulations 2014, SI 2014/3050. 
28 Particularly in comparison with the original proposals.  For commentary on the legislation see: Gemma 
Mitchell, ‘Encouraging Fathers to Care: The Children and Families Act 2014 and Shared Parental Leave’ (2015) 
44 I.L.J. 123; Michelle Weldon-Johns, ‘From modern workplaces to modern families – Re-envisioning the work-
family conflict’ (2015) 37(4) J.S.W.F.L. 395. 
29 BIS, Flexible, effective, fair: promoting economic growth through a strong and efficient labour market (BIS, 
2011), 4. 
30 Linda Dickens, ‘The Coalition government’s reforms to employment tribunals and statutory employment 
rights – echoes of the past’ ( 2014) 45 I.R.J. 234, 238. 
31 Bob Hepple, ‘Back to the Future: Employment Law under the Coalition Government’ (2013) 42 ILJ 203, 203. 
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address this concern and return it to its original roots.  Elements of this are evident from their 
arguments in favour of its devolution. 
The Scottish Government’s main justifications for having control of ‘key economic 
levers’ such as Employment Law are that it will enable them to ‘create jobs and tackle 
inequality’,32 and ‘boost competitiveness’.33  While this is reminiscent of the arguments used 
by the Coalition government, and previous Conservative governments, to justify deregulation 
and the erosion of the role of trade unions, it is clear that the Scottish Government does not 
support the same approach towards Labour Law regulation.  This is underscored by the 
Scottish Government’s Working Together Review which examines the tripartite relationship 
between trade unions, employers’ groups and the government working together towards 
more effective and successful workplaces.34  Within the review it is clear that trade unions 
play a significant role, not only within workplaces, but also at a sectoral level, within wider 
society and, notably, that they are viewed as key stakeholders in the development of policy.35  
This evidences a significant role for unions in Scotland, which is not similarly reflected within 
the rest of the UK.  While the review also acknowledges that employers’ groups have to 
engage more fully in order to achieve more effective social partnerships,36 it shows that the 
Scottish Government is committed to engaging all relevant stakeholders and working 
together to address, and find solutions for, labour market issues.  This mirrors strongly the 
model of social partnership which operates at a European level,37 which we discuss further 
below, and provides a distinct foundation for labour law within Scotland as compared with 
the rest of the UK, which does not formally recognise, or promote, social partnership 
agreements.38 
                                                          
32 Scottish Government, More Powers for the Scottish Parliament (The Scottish Government, 2014), iii. 
33 Scottish Government, Beyond Smith – Scottish Government proposals for more powers for the Scottish 
Parliament (The Scottish Government, 2015), para 5, see also 21-30. 
34 Scottish Government, Working Together Review: Progressive Workplace Policies in Scotland, (Scottish 
Government, 2014). 
35 Scottish Government, Working Together Review: Progressive Workplace Policies in Scotland, (Scottish 
Government, 2014), para 5.6-5.26 
36 Scottish Government, Working Together Review: Progressive Workplace Policies in Scotland, (Scottish 
Government, 2014), paras 5.25-5.26. 
37 This is acknowledged in Scottish Government, Working Together Review: Progressive Workplace Policies in 
Scotland, (Scottish Government, 2014), para 5.25. 
38 Scottish Government, Working Together Review: Progressive Workplace Policies in Scotland, (Scottish 
Government, 2014), para 5.4. 
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 This analysis indicates that Scottish Labour Law would be based on the core principles 
of equality and social partnership.  This suggests a stronger role for trade unions and/or other 
employee representatives, more dialogue and partnership between interested parties – 
recognising tripartism in all aspects of labour relations - and a greater focus on, and 
recognition of, the inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees. 
Some support for mapping the way forward in Scotland can be taken from Hepple, 
who argued that the way forward for Labour Law may be a re-strengthening of labour 
relations, by enhancing the role of workplace representatives, and re-envisioning workplace 
structures.39  This appears to reflect the existing relationships between trade unions, some 
employers, and the Scottish Government, and also the recommendations of the Working 
Together Review.40  If Labour Law were devolved to Scotland, the Scottish Parliament and 
Government would have the opportunity to renegotiate the relationship between the social 
partners and to re-engage trade unions and employer’s representatives in constructive 
dialogue, as opposed to maintaining a focus on adversarial relationships.  In addition, they 
could re-envision workplace structures that would effectively meet the needs of both 
employers and employees, something which is, arguably, lacking at present.   
 
Overview of current issues in UK Labour Law 
In order to clearly justify the recommendations for change, it is important to consider the 
main areas of deregulation enacted by the Coalition and present UK governments and the 
inherent problems with these.  The key changes discussed here are: increasing the unfair 
dismissal qualifying service period; Employment Tribunal (ET) fees and reforms; and reducing 
the consultation period in collective redundancies.  Each of these will be examined in turn. 
 
  
                                                          
39 Bob Hepple, ‘Back to the Future: Employment Law under the Coalition Government’ (2013) 42 ILJ 203, 203. 
40 Scottish Government, Working Together Review: Progressive Workplace Policies in Scotland, (Scottish 




The period of qualifying service required to access the legal protection against unfair dismissal 
has been increased from 1 to 2 years, 41  removing around 3 million employees from its 
protection.42  This increases and returns the qualifying service period back to that enacted 
under the Thatcher government and which was unsuccessfully challenged in R v Secretary of 
State for Employment ex p Seymour-Smith.43  Although it had been accepted by the majority 
in the House of Lords that, given the continued disparate impact, the provision indirectly 
discriminated against women,44 it was nevertheless held by the same 3:2 majority that it was 
objectively justified because it sought to encourage recruitment by employers. 45 
Nonetheless, following a change of UK Government in 1997, the qualifying period was 
reduced to one year prior to the case returning to the House of Lords.46  The return to this 
extended qualifying service period raises further questions about whether it could again be 
challenged, particularly since it was accepted in Seymour-Smith that it could in principle 
amount to indirect sex discrimination.47  Rodgers further notes that there is also the potential 
argument of disparate impact on young people and ethnic minorities, 48  and Dickens 
continues to include women in this consideration.49  In addition, the fact that discriminatory 
effects were previously identified when the qualifying period was formerly 2 years raises 
questions as to whether the UK Government could continue to claim that the policy is 
                                                          
41 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 108 as amended by Unfair Dismissal and Statement of Reasons for Dismissal 
(Variation of Qualifying Period) Order 2012, SI 2012/989, art 3. 
42 As estimated by KD Ewing and J Hendy, ‘Unfair Dismissal Law Changes – Unfair?’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 115, 116. 
43 R v Secretary of State for Employment ex p Seymour-Smith (No.2) [2000] 1 WLR 435 following a decision 
from the ECJ, now CJEU, in Case C-167/97  R v Secretary of State for Employment ex p Seymour-Smith [1999] 
E.C.R. I-623, challenging The Unfair Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order 1985, SI 1985/782. 
44 R v Secretary of State for Employment ex p Seymour-Smith (No.2) [2000] 1 W.L.R. 435, 444-446 (Lord Goff) 
and 447-449 (Lord Nicholls). 
45 R v Secretary of State for Employment ex p Seymour-Smith (No.2) [2000] 1 W.L.R. 435, 450-452 (Lord 
Nicholls). 
46 The Unfair Dismissal and Statement of Reasons for Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order 1999, SI 
1999/1436. 
47 As discussed by Ewan McGaughey, ‘Unfair dismissal reform: political ping-pong with equality?’ (2012) Issue 
226 Equal Opportunities Review, available from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2014699 [Accessed 4 July 2016]. 
48 Lisa Rodgers, ‘The UK Employment Law Review and Changes to Unfair Dismissal’ (2012) 1 E-Journal of 
International and Comparative Labour Studies 145, 148-149. 
49 Linda Dickens, ‘The Coalition government’s reforms to employment tribunals and statutory employment 
rights – echoes of the past’ ( 2014) 45 I.R.J. 234, 238. 
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objectively justified,50 and that it can meet its claimed objectives, which were also previously 
questioned.51 
It is further notable that the rationale behind the current policy reflects those previous 
objectives, which are similarly identified as to reduce burdens on employers and thereby 
encourage them to hire more staff.52  Commentators have been unconvinced by these claims; 
instead, they argue that there is no evidence to support the Government’s arguments.53  This 
is further reinforced by the retention of the one year qualification period in Northern 
Ireland,54  which suggests that the arguments advanced here have not been accepted in 
another part of the UK either.  It is likely that the change in practice will do little more than 
undermine individual employment rights by further restricting employees’ access to justice.  
Furthermore, the actual gains to employers in terms of potentially successful unfair dismissal 
claims is estimated by Ewing and Harding to amount to only 100 claims.55  When viewed in 
the context of those who have lost their rights, this benefit is negligible.  It certainly makes 
employment more precarious during the initial 2-year period and, as argued by Rodgers, could 
encourage a lack of investment in staff training and development and instead encourage 
higher staff turnover in order to avoid employment protection rights. 56   The potential 
consequence of this is reduced productivity and commitment from both employees and 
employers.  This would surely be less cost-effective in the long run than increasing the burden 
on employees, particularly women, young persons and ethnic minorities.57   
                                                          
50 Which it does in BIS, Resolving Workplace Disputes: Government response to the consultation (BIS, 2011), 
para 117 despite acknowledging that it could have a disparate impact on certain groups, it is noted that this 
would not be considerable and in any event would be objectively justifiable.   
51 For instance, by the Court of Appeal in R v Secretary of State for Employment ex p Seymour-Smith (No.1) 
[1996] All ER (EC) 1, [1995] ICR 889, although the decision was overturned by R v Secretary of State for 
Employment ex p Seymour-Smith (No.2) [2000] 1 W.L.R. 435, 450-451 it highlights the limited impact of the 
policy on recruitment practices. 
52 BIS, Employment Law Review: Annual Update 2012 (BIS, 2012), 5, 6.  
53 KD Ewing and J Hendy, ‘Unfair Dismissal Law Changes – Unfair?’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 115, 116-119; Lisa Rodgers, 
‘The UK Employment Law Review and Changes to Unfair Dismissal’ (2012) 1 E-Journal of International and 
Comparative Labour Studies 145, 147-149; Linda Dickens, ‘The Coalition government’s reforms to employment 
tribunals and statutory employment rights – echoes of the past’ ( 2014) 45 I.R.J. 234, 239-24. 
54 Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996, SI 1996/1919, art 140 
55 KD Ewing and J Hendy, ‘Unfair Dismissal Law Changes – Unfair?’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 115, 118 
56 Lisa Rodgers, ‘The UK Employment Law Review and Changes to Unfair Dismissal’ (2012) 1 E-Journal of 
International and Comparative Labour Studies 145, 147. 
57 Lisa Rodgers, ‘The UK Employment Law Review and Changes to Unfair Dismissal’ (2012) 1 E-Journal of 
International and Comparative Labour Studies 145, 148-149; Linda Dickens, ‘The Coalition government’s 






The introduction of ET fees further reinforces these concerns. 58   Tribunal Fees were 
introduced as part of the wider reforms to reduce the burdens on employers since it was 
perceived to be too easy to bring unmeritorious or spurious cases against employers.59  In 
addition, reducing costs was also a key consideration.60  Individuals either have to pay an 
initial issue fee of £160 for ‘Type A’ claims, or £250 for ‘Type B’ claims, and then an additional 
hearing fee of £230 or £950 respectively.61  If the decision is appealed to the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal (EAT), then further issue fees of £400 are payable and a further £1200 when 
it proceeds to an oral hearing.62  The reason for the difference between Types A and B is said 
to be the complexity of the legal issues raised, but the reality is that since ‘Type B’ claims 
include unfair dismissal, discrimination and equal pay it makes it more difficult for claimants 
who have been subjected to such treatment, and are more likely to be vulnerable, and, in 
some instances now unemployed, to raise actions against their (former) employers.63  While 
the fees will be paid by the employer if the case is decided in favour of the employee, the 
presence and the level of fees may prevent certain individuals raising claims in the first 
instance.  Not only does the introduction of fees potentially restrict access to justice,64 but in 
                                                          
58 Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013, SI 2013/1893.  
59 BIS, Resolving Workplace Disputes: a consultation (BIS, 2011), 15-16 and 49-50; Ministry of Justice, Charging 
fees in the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Consultation Paper CP22/2011, 
Ministry of Justice 2011), 15.  David Mangan, ‘Employment Tribunal Reforms to Boost the Economy’ (2013) 42 
I.L.J. 409, 417-418, argues that the theme of employees as vexatious claimants underpins current employment 
law reforms. 
60 BIS, Resolving Workplace Disputes: a consultation (BIS, 2011), 15-16; BIS, Resolving Workplace Disputes: 
Government response to the consultation (BIS, 2011), 6. 
61 Categories and fees outlined in Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 
2013, SI 2013/1893, sch 2, tables 2-3. 
62 Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013, SI 2013/1893, arts 13-14. 
63 For commentary on the implications of these reforms see: N Busby and M McDermont, ‘Workers, 
Marginalised Voices and the Employment Tribunal System: Some Preliminary Findings’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 166; 
David Mangan, ‘Employment Tribunal Reforms to Boost the Economy’ (2013) 42 ILJ 409; Linda Dickens, ‘The 
Coalition government’s reforms to employment tribunals and statutory employment rights – echoes of the 
past’ ( 2014) 45 I.R.J. 234. 
64 Bob Hepple, ‘Back to the Future: Employment Law under the Coalition Government’ (2013) 42 I.L.J. 203, 206.  
KD Ewing and J Hendy, ‘Unfair Dismissal Law Changes – Unfair?’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 115, 120-121 also raise some 
concerns about the introduction of fees. 
12 
 
doing so it arguably renders individualised employment rights as negligible because, if they 
cannot be enforced, what significance do they have?65   
Despite the preponderance of critiques of the new fees regime, similar arguments 
were raised and rejected in an unsuccessful challenge to the introduction of fees brought by 
Unison.66  In this application for judicial review,67 Unison’s arguments were two-fold.  Firstly, 
it argued that the introduction of fees violated the EU principle of effectiveness because it 
had a negative impact on access to justice for certain groups, making it ‘virtually impossible 
or at least exceptionally difficult for a significant number of potential applicants to afford to 
bring a claim.’68  This reinforces many of the arguments raised above concerning access to 
justice.  Secondly, they argued that this amounted to indirect discrimination against persons 
(particularly women) with various protected characteristics, and that this disadvantage has 
not been justified.69  This, again, reflects concerns raised in the literature above regarding the 
disproportionate effect of the rules on the most vulnerable groups, particularly those who 
are/were in low paid jobs.  Nevertheless, the English High Court rejected both arguments.  
What was notable about the decision was that, while it was accepted that ET claims had 
dramatically reduced following the introduction of fees,70 this was deemed insufficient on its 
own to show that individuals were ‘unable’ as opposed to just ‘unwilling’ to raise claims.71  
Instead, the High Court indicated that evidence of specific identifiable individuals who had 
been denied access as a consequence of the introduction of fees had to be ascertained, in 
order to determine if the measure breached the EU principle of effectiveness.72  Furthermore, 
the High Court rejected the discrimination claims on the basis that: focusing on a self-selected 
                                                          
65 A point also raised by David Mangan, ‘Employment Tribunal Reforms to Boost the Economy’ (2013) 42 I.L.J. 
409, 418. 
66 R. (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor and another (No 2) [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin).  For a 
discussion of the decision see Nicole Busby, ‘Challenging Employment Tribunal Fees: R (Unison) v Lord 
Chancellor and another (No 2)’ (2015) 19 Edin LR 254. 
67 There had been a previous application that had been rejected because there was insufficient evidence to 
assess the claims presented given that fees had only been introduced months earlier: R. (on the application of 
Unison) v Lord Chancellor and another (No 1) [2014] EWHC 218 (Admin). 
68 R. (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor and another (No 2) [2014] E.W.H.C. 4198 (Admin) [2]. 
69 R. (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor and another (No 2) [2014] E.W.H.C. 4198 (Admin) [2]. 
70 R. (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor and another (No 2) [2014] E.W.H.C. 4198 (Admin) [55]-
[60] and [96]. 
71 R. (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor and another (No 2) [2014] E.W.H.C. 4198 (Admin) [60]. 




sub-group was inappropriate;73 and the difference in fees between ‘Type A’ and ‘Type B’ 
claims was justified on the basis of their increased complexity.74  In reaching this decision, the 
High Court accepted that the UK Government’s aims of transferring a part of the costs onto 
users, efficiency and encouraging ADR, underpinned the introduction of fees, and that it was 
not merely a cost-saving initiative.75  In doing so, it reinforces the widening gap between 
employers’ and employees’ interests, a factor which clearly underpins these various 
employment law reforms. 
Despite this decision, it is clear that the introduction of fees has had an impact on the 
choices that individuals make regarding whether to pursue claims in the ET.76  A point that 
was not lost on the judges in the High Court.77  As Busby argues, it is regrettable that the High 
Court could not infer from this evidence that the introduction of such fees is a barrier to access 
to justice for a number of working persons.78  It is again notable that the Northern Ireland 
Assembly has not introduced similar fees for access to their Industrial Tribunals and the Fair 
Employment Tribunal.  Furthermore, the Scottish Government has recently pledged to abolish 
ET fees in the current parliamentary session using newly devolved powers over tribunals.79  
This clearly reinforces the distinctly different priorities and approaches towards regulating 
labour relations between Scotland and England and Wales, which could diverge further if the 
power lay in Scotland.80 
                                                          
73 R. (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor and another (No 2) [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin) [70]-[75]. 
74 R. (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor and another (No 2) [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin) [69]. 
75 R. (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor and another (No 2) [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin) [83]-[90]. 
76 The numbers of ET claims accepted has reduced from 191,541 in 2012/13, to 105,803 in 2013/14 and 61,306 
in 2014/15.  Figures taken from Ministry of Justice, Employment and EAT tribunal statistics: financial year 
2013-14 (Ministry of Justice 2014), Table E.1; Ministry of Justice, Tribunals and Gender Recognition Certificate 
Statistics Quarterly: January to March 2015 (Ministry of Justice Statistics bulletin 2015), Employment tribunal 
receipts tables: annex C, Table C.2 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tribunals-and-gender-
recognition-certificate-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2015 [Accessed 4 July 2016]. 
77 R. (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor and another (No 2) [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin) [55]-[60] 
and [96]. 
78 Nicole Busby, ‘Challenging Employment Tribunal Fees: R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor and another (No 2)’ 
(2015) 19 Edin. L.R. 254, 258. 
79 The Scottish Government, A Stronger Scotland: The Government’s Programme for Scotland 2015-16 (2015) 
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0048/00484439.pdf [Accessed 4 July 2016].  Rights conferred by the Scotland 
Act 2016 c.11, s.39. 
80 It is acknowledged that a Fees Remission scheme was introduced in Schedule 3 of the Employment Tribunals 
and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013, however, criticisms have been made of the scheme 
from a number of sources, including Citizens’ Advice Bureaux. (Citizens’ Advice Bureaux, Four in five deterred 
by employment tribunal fees, Citizens’ Advice Bureaux, 2014), https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/about-
us/how-citizens-advice-works/media/press-releases/four-in-five-deterred-by-employment-tribunal-
fees/ [accessed 16 August 2016].  Notably, in their 30th September 2015 response to the Ministry of Justice for 
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The introduction of ET fees also raises wider questions about the role and function of 
ETs.  It is asserted that ETs have now moved away from their industrial and tripartite roots,81 
which enabled individuals to have easier access to justice because they were quicker and 
more accessible than traditional courts, they were also less formal but decisions were made 
by experts including those from both sides of practice.82  Instead, they are now much more 
like traditional civil courts. 83   This is evident in: moves towards increased formalism; 84 
creating barriers to access to justice;85 renaming Tribunal Chairmen as Employment Judges 
and extending their discretion to decide to sit alone in unfair dismissal claims;86 as well as 
providing that appeals to the EAT may now normally be heard by judges sitting alone.87  The 
permitting of judges to sit alone in unfair dismissal cases is all the more concerning given that, 
on the one hand, these cases are categorised as ‘Type B’ cases and, thus, more complicated, 
warranting higher fees.  On the other hand, they are now capable of being decided by the 
Employment Judge sitting alone.88  If such cases fall within the ‘Type B’ category does that not 
indicate that they are so sufficiently complex that the perspectives from both sides of industry 
                                                          
England & Wales’ Review of Fees, the Chair of the Law Society of England & Wales’ Employment Committee 
drew attention to the UK Government’s projections in its Fees consultation held in 2012 which stated that 11-
13% of claimants would receive full fee remission and 53% of claimants would receive part remission.  This 
contrasted significantly with the Government’s own statistics published on 10th September 2015, which 
showed that in fact only 21% of all claimants received any remission at 
all. http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policy-campaigns/consultation-responses/letter-to-the-ministry-of-justice-
employment-tribunal-fees-review-team/[accessed 16th August 2016]. 
81 S Corby and P Latreille, ‘Employment Tribunals and the Civil Courts: Isomorphism Exemplified’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 
387, 394-395; Linda Dickens, ‘The Coalition government’s reforms to employment tribunals and statutory 
employment rights – echoes of the past’ ( 2014) 45 I.R.J. 234, 236 and 244. 
82 See the Royal Donovan Commission: HMSO, Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers’ Associations (Cmnd 3623, 1968) 156 and 157. 
Linda Dickens, ‘The Coalition government’s reforms to employment tribunals and statutory employment rights 
– echoes of the past’ ( 2014) 45 I.R.J. 234, 245. 
83 And are increasingly being treated as such by the government as noted in Ministry of Justice, Charging fees 
in the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Consultation Paper CP22/2011, Ministry of 
Justice 2011), 11. For a discussion of the evolution of ETs see S Corby and P Latreille, ‘Employment Tribunals 
and the Civil Courts: Isomorphism Exemplified’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 387. 
84 S Corby and P Latreille, ‘Employment Tribunals and the Civil Courts: Isomorphism Exemplified’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 
387, 396-398. 
85 N Busby and M McDermont, ‘Workers, Marginalised Voices and the Employment Tribunal System: Some 
Preliminary Findings’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 166; S Corby and P Latreille, ‘Employment Tribunals and the Civil Courts: 
Isomorphism Exemplified’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 387, 399-401 
86 Now extended to include unfair dismissal actions: Employment Tribunals Act 1996, ss 4(2) and (3)(c) inserted 
by Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (Tribunal Composition) Order 2012/988, art 2.   
87 Employment Tribunals Act 1996, s 28 as amended by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, s 12. 
88 For commentary see Bob Hepple, ‘Back to the Future: Employment Law under the Coalition Government’ 
(2013) 42 I.L.J. 203, 212-213. 
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and practice would provide valuable insights in the decision-making process?  While the UK 
Government claimed to have acknowledged and accepted such concerns following the 
responses to the consultation, they were keen to press on with the reforms, in order to realise 
the cost-savings potentials that they could bring.89  While the UK Government argues that the 
discretionary power remains with the Employment Judge to convene a full hearing if it is 
deemed necessary, these reforms have greatly reduced the number and types of hearings for 
which a full ET is convened, thereby discarding the concept of ‘the industrial jury’ and losing 
the expertise and first-hand experience of industrial relations provided by lay members; 
qualities which were seen as essential when Tribunals were first established in the 1970s.90  
This reinforces the underpinning rationale for such changes, which is purely cost-saving.91  
The underlying problem with this may be that, because the lines between ETs and civil courts 
are now so blurred, the founding rationale for ETs is entirely obscured and undermined.   
Furthermore, the current focus on relatively unstructured ADR and early conciliation, 
which does not necessarily reach outcomes on the basis of the application of Labour Law,92 
nevertheless signals a fundamental erosion of Labour Law.  Hepple wondered how long the 
tripartite panel will continue to be used in discrimination cases,93 and it may not be long 
before ETs disappear entirely in favour of a more integrated civil court structure.94  
These changes appear to reflect a wider trend within Labour Law away from valuing 
and reflecting the interests and perspectives of both employees and employers (and their 
representatives).  A position which is arguably in contrast with the Scottish Government’s 
support for social partnership.  Our proposals for revising the dispute resolution framework 
                                                          
89 BIS, Resolving Workplace Disputes: Government response to the consultation (BIS, 2011), 31-32. 
90 “Whilst I do not necessarily say that the inevitability of the result is the criterion that we should adopt, we 
have to remember that although the Employment Appeal Tribunal itself has of course industrial experience, it 
sits as an appellate tribunal from the Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal is not merely a fact finding 
body, it is an industrial jury. That is not merely a phrase, but a concept that is to be taken seriously. It is only 
going to be in an extreme case, one that is very clear, that it is going to be possible for an appellate body 
properly to say that a jury would have inevitably reached the conclusion that the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
reached, when in the original case, albeit proceeding upon an incorrect basis, the Industrial Tribunal had come 
to a contrary conclusion”. Lord Justice Buxton in Wilson v Post Office [2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 3036 
91 BIS, Resolving Workplace Disputes: a consultation (BIS, 2011), 43-45 
92 See some of the comments on the role of ACAS in resolving disputes in N Busby and M McDermont, 
‘Workers, Marginalised Voices and the Employment Tribunal System: Some Preliminary Findings’ (2012) 41 
I.L.J. 166, 181-182. 
93 Bob Hepple, ‘Back to the Future: Employment Law under the Coalition Government’ (2013) 42 I.L.J. 203, 212. 




reflect the need to return to the founding principles whilst also recognising the need to find 
an alternative mechanism for doing so.  A return to the original functions of ETs, even in the 
guise of other dispute resolution mechanisms, may foster more productive workplaces and 
enable Labour Law to function more effectively. 
Collective redundancy consultation 
The final notable reform considered here is the reduction of the consultation period for 
collective redundancies involving over 100 employees within one workplace from 90 to 45 
days.95  The Coalition Government’s aims behind this reform were to: improve the quality of 
consultations; better enable employers to respond to varying market conditions; and balance 
the interests of all employees, those made redundant as well as those remaining. 96   In 
particular, the Government wanted to ensure that there was: clear legislation; good relations 
between employer and employee representatives; and mechanisms enabling the 
Government to intervene where necessary.97  While these are surely desirable objectives, and 
the new consultation period more closely reflects the EU Law position of 30 days,98 it was 
enacted in a very different legal and industrial relations context.  Trade unions are in a much 
weaker position in the UK than elsewhere in Europe;99 they have more limited opportunities 
to undertake industrial action, which will be made much weaker following the enactment of 
the incumbent UK Government’s recent reforms; 100  and collective bargaining is less 
pervasive.  Trade unions are thus coming from a very different starting position and it is likely 
that they will not have been involved in any dialogue prior to redundancies being considered.  
If the Government genuinely wants to improve the quality of consultation, then more has to 
be done to reform the industrial relations framework and improve relationships between 
employers and employee representatives more generally in the first instance.  Otherwise, the 
more limited period for collective consultation suggests that the right is again undervalued in 
                                                          
95 Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1992, s 188(1A)(a) inserted by Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992 (Amendment) Order 2013, SI 2013/763, art 3(2). 
96 BIS, Collective Redundancies: Consultation on changes to the rules (BIS 2012), 5 and 15. 
97 BIS, Collective Redundancies: Consultation on changes to the rules (BIS 2012), 5 and 16. 
98 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating 
to collective redundancies [1998] OJ L225/16, art 4 
99 As discussed further below 
100 Recent changes to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 c.52, as amended by the 
Trade Union Act 2016 c.15 but not yet in force, include: a 50% turnout threshold requirement for ballots to be 
valid (s.226(iia)); 40% of those entitled to vote must vote in favour of industrial action in cases involving 
‘important public services’ (ss.226(2B)-(2E)); and reforms to picketing (ss.219-220A).  
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the UK context and could mean that solutions and/or alternatives to redundancy are unlikely 
to be found.   
 Despite these reforms aiming to improve employment conditions and reduce burdens 
on employers, in reality, employment is much more precarious, and the stability previously 
provided by Trade Unions is also lacking.101  If Labour Law were devolved to Scotland, a new 
path could be set which would move away from the current trajectory of erosion of Labour 
Law.  This would enable the Scottish Parliament to better meet the needs of Scottish workers 
and create Scottish solutions to address the current deconstruction of Labour Law and Labour 
Relations.  With that in mind, lessons may be drawn from alternative European models which 
may help to influence and underpin a distinctly Scottish model. 
 
European influences 
When re-envisioning Labour Law in Scotland, account should also be taken of the influence 
of EU Labour Law and its inherent focus on social partnership.  The result of the recent UK 
Referendum on EU membership demonstrates that voters in Scotland clearly see their future 
as part of the EU102 and, indeed, it brings into sharper focus the difference in the political and 
social perspectives of Scotland, on the one hand, and England & Wales, on the other.  With 
the likely prospect of a second referendum on Scottish independence, it is timely to consider 
how an independent Scotland might develop its own approach to labour law and to appraise 
the internal and external influences which might mould and shape this approach.  
Within the European Union, certain aspects of Labour Law fall within the scope of the 
social policy provisions of the Treaties.103  Some of these aspects are highly developed at EU 
level e.g. working time, transfers of undertakings, redundancy consultations,104 and others 
are not e.g. dismissals, strikes and trade union regulation. 105   Yet, there are three core 
                                                          
101 As noted by Bob Hepple, ‘The Future of Labour Law’ (1995) 24 I.L.J. 303, 306 and still equally relevant now. 
102 See fn.4, above. 
103 Article 153TFEU. 
104 e.g. Directive 2003/88 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [2003] OJ L299/9; 
Directive 2001/23 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of 
employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses 
[2001] OJ L82/16; Directive 98/59 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective 
redundancies [1998] OJ L225/16; Directive 2009/38/EC on the establishment of a European Works Councils or 
a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes 
of informing and consulting employees (Recast). 
105 Art.153(5) TFEU. 
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principles and themes of EU labour law which are commonly reflected in the labour law 
jurisdictions of most EU Member States: tripartism, solidarity and social partnership/social 
dialogue.  The principle of solidarity is perhaps more concerned with the design of the 
substantive law, whereas tripartism and social partnership are reflected in both the system 
for dispute settlement and the substantive law.  Elements of these themes have already been 
identified in our previous discussions of Scottish labour law, and they interconnect with the 
two main areas for reform identified previously, namely dispute resolution and collective 
labour relations. 
Tripartism is a term which describes, loosely, the joint roles played by states, 
employers’ organisations and employees’ organisations in fostering and encouraging 
harmonious workplace relations.106  The extent to which tripartism is utilised varies from state 
to state and is arguably undermined in the wider UK context, however, it is the hallmark of 
the International Labour Organisation’s structure:  ‘This tripartite structure makes the ILO a 
unique forum in which the governments and the social partners of the economy of its 
Member States can freely and openly debate and elaborate labour standards and policies’.107  
A commitment to tripartism in Scotland is in keeping with these wider labour law standards 
and objectives.108 
The principle of solidarity is stated in Art 2TEU to be a value common to Member 
States and, in Art 3TEU, it is an aim of the EU to promote solidarity between Member States, 
among peoples and between generations.  Specific to the Labour Law context, solidarity is 
further provided for in Title IV (Arts 27-38) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights109 where 
it includes inter alia employees’ information and consultation rights, collective bargaining and 
strike action, fair and just working conditions, protection against unjustified dismissal, 
prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work.  Since the Charter now 
                                                          
106 The International Labour Organisation (ILO 1996-2015): http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/who-we-
are/lang--en/index.htm [Accessed 4 July 2016]. “The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the only 
tripartite UN agency with government, employer and worker representatives.” 
107 ILO, Tripartite constituency (ILO 1996-2015) 
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/who-we-are/tripartite-constituents/lang--en/index.html [Accessed 4 
July 2016]. 
108 As discussed earlier 
109 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C83/389 
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has the same legal value as the EU Treaties,110 these ‘rights, freedoms and principles’111 are 
now accorded the status of fundamental rights within each member state’s legal system.  It 
is submitted, therefore, that the solidarity principle is an important reference point in the 
context of this discussion and that these core areas of labour law should be fully and properly 
integrated into the design of an effective framework for labour law and dispute settlement.  
The concept of social partnership and social dialogue was introduced first by the Single 
European Act (SEA),112 which inserted a new Article 118B in the Treaty of Rome, entrusting 
the Commission with the task of developing dialogue between management and labour at EU 
level. This was developed further by the Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht in 
1992.113   Article 151TFEU provides one of the EU’s social policy objectives as: ‘dialogue 
between management and labour’.  The interplay between tripartism and social partnership 
is seen in Art 152TFEU: ‘The Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at 
its level….It shall facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy.’  
This is taken a step further in Art 155(1)TFEU which provides that ‘[s]hould management and 
labour so desire, the dialogue between them at Union level may lead to contractual relations, 
including agreements’.  Such agreements are given the force of law by Art 155(2).  Art 153(3) 
extends the concept even further by providing that Member States may ‘entrust management 
and labour, at their joint request, with the implementation of directives’, devolving power to 
the social partners at national level to introduce measures by agreement to satisfy the state’s 
compliance with the directive’s provisions.114  This also reflects some of the themes discussed 
previously and appears to correspond with the greater focus on social partnership and 
tripartism evident in Scotland as compared with the rest of the UK. 
It is, therefore, submitted that these three principles ought to be central to any 
discussion of the design of a new system of labour law for Scotland.  The opportunity exists 
for the Scottish Parliament to break with the UK’s propensity for labour law to become a 
                                                          
110 Article 6 TEU 
111 Article 6(1)TEU 
112 A Treaty which amended the founding Treaties (ECSC, EEC and Euratom).  It was signed in February 1986 
and came into force on 1st July 1987. 
113 Treaty on the European Union [1992] OJ C191/01.  The current provisions are at Art 151-161 TFEU of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
114 This has only been used once in the UK, when an agreement was reached between the TUC and the CBI 
which became the blueprint for the Agency Workers’ Regulations 2010, SI 2010/93.  Following the defeat of 




political football, kicked back and forward with each change of government, and to design 
both a framework for labour dispute settlement and a substantive labour law which is fit for 
21st century purpose: modern; compatible with EU and ILO principles; fair, just, efficient and 
effective.  This paper considers a sample of labour dispute settlement procedures in other 
European jurisdictions beginning with the Republic of Ireland which, as mentioned previously, 
has similar demographics and experiences to those in Scotland.  These examples will then 
inform proposed reforms of dispute settlement mechanisms in Scotland, following devolution 
of powers from the UK Parliament. 
 
Overview of dispute settlement in the Republic of Ireland 
In 2015, there were major changes taking place in the Republic of Ireland by way of reform of 
their administrative structures of employment law, as well as changes to aspects of 
compliance and enforcement.  The relevant legislation is the Workplace Relations Act 2015, 
which was adopted in May 2015 and entered into force on 1st October 2015.115 
The key aim of the legislation is to rationalise all the various different bodies that are 
active in the field of industrial relations law into a single point of contact for citizens, to be 
known as the Workplace Relations Commission.116  Significant changes involve the abolition 
of Labour Commissioners117 and the creation of a new post of Adjudication Officer, whose 
function is designed to be a mandatory intermediate step in the dispute settlement process 
before a party may commence full litigation in the Labour Court.118  This is not the same as 
the ‘early conciliation’ scheme within the UK structure, as it requires attendance by both 
parties at a private hearing before the Adjudication Officer, who has power to determine 
issues in some types of claims (e.g. re-instatement, re-engagement) and, in others, to issue 
                                                          
115 Workplace Relations, ‘Reform of the State's Workplace Relations Structures’ (Workplace Relations Act 2015, 
Number 16 of 2015) 
http://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/About_the_Reform_Programme/Reform_of_the_State_s_Workplace_R
elations_Structures/Reform_of_the_State_s_Workplace_Relations_Structures.html [Accessed 4 July 2016]. 
116 Workplace Relations Act 2015, part 2.  The Commission is headed by a Director General who determines 
the nature and destination of onward referrals of cases for resolution. 
117 Known also as ‘Rights Commissioners’, they had power to investigate disputes, grievances and claims 
referred by individuals under employment legislation.  Depending on the statutory provision, they could issue 
binding or non-binding recommendations or decisions.  There existed a right of appeal to the Labour Court or 
Employment Appeal Tribunal in appropriate cases. 
118 Workplace Relations Act 2015, part 4. 
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non-binding recommendations in regard to settlement of the parties’ dispute.119  Either party 
may seek a review of the Adjudication Officer’s decision in the Labour Court.120  Enforcement 
of the Adjudication Officer’s decision, or a decision of the Labour Court, is via an enforcement 
order issued by the District Court.  Further, as part of an anti-avoidance strategy in relation to 
compliance with Labour Court judgments, it is proposed to apply criminal law sanctions to an 
employer’s failure to comply with a judgment to pay compensation to an employee.121  This 
is done through the appointment of Inspectors, who have wide powers to require employers 
to provide information and, in some cases, have power to issue compliance notices and fixed 
penalties for certain labour law breaches.  The Commission may also refer appropriate cases 
to a Mediation Officer.  The effect of this reform is to bring together the enforcement regimes 
for minimum wage rules, illegal workers, working time, health and safety, under one umbrella 
with a statutory obligation on the new Commission to draft a 3-year strategic plan for the 
improvement in workplace relations, and an annual work plan, to be provided to the 
appropriate Minister of the Irish Government.122 
This re-structuring of dispute resolution structures retains elements of informalism 
which was characteristic of the ET system,123 but also mechanisms for enforcing the decisions 
reached by the parties.  In doing so, it appears to encourage parties to reach mutually 
acceptable conclusions to complaints as opposed to reinforcing adversarialism in the first 
instance. 
 
Other European examples 
A quick glance at the labour dispute settlement procedures operated by some other European 
states reveals a striking similarity in approach to that adopted in the Republic of Ireland.  In 
France, the Conseil des Prud’hommes has a first ‘conciliation stage’, where one ‘juge 
employeur’ and one ‘juge salarié’ will attempt to conciliate the matter.124  The parties’ (or 
their representatives’) attendance is compulsory.  If there is a tie, the case will proceed to a 
                                                          
119 Workplace Relations Act 2015, s.41. 
120 Workplace Relations Act 2015, s.44. A further final appeal may lie to the High Court on a point of law. 
121 Workplace Relations Act 2015, s.51. 
122 Workplace Relations Act 2015, ss.21-23. 
123 For example, the post of Mediation Officer, to whom the Director-General may refer the dispute if s/he 
considers that it may be resolved at an early stage prior to being referred to an Adjudication Officer. 
124 Ministère de la Justice, France, ‘Conseil de prud’hommes’: http://www.justice.gouv.fr/organisation-de-la-
justice-10031/lordre-judiciaire-10033/conseil-de-prudhommes-12033.html [Accessed 4 July 2016]. 
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Hearing stage to be heard by an equal number of ‘juge employeur’ and ‘juge salariés’.  
Decisions are taken by an absolute majority; where there is a tie, the case is sent back to the 
same group but with a ‘juge d’instance’ presiding this time. 125   The right to appeal is 
determined by the value and type of claim, however, where appeals are permitted these are 
heard within the formal court structure at the Court of Appeal.126  This structure is replicated 
to a large extent in Switzerland, in the Tribunal des Prud’hommes.127 
In Germany, there is a three-tier system consisting of first-instance Labour Courts, 
second-instance ‘Land’ Labour Courts, and the final-instance Federal Labour Court.128  Labour 
law jurisdiction is undertaken by panels of several members.  At Labour Courts and Land 
Labour Courts these panels are called Chambers and at the Federal Labour Court they are 
called Senates.129 Chambers consist of one judge and two lay members, representing the 
employers’ and employees’ sides, respectively.  Senates at the Federal Labour Court are made 
up of three judges and two lay members representing the employers’ and employees’ sides, 
respectively.130  Labour Courts are first-instance courts where evidence is heard and judgment 
given.  At appeal, the case is reheard by the second-instance ‘Land’ Labour Court, both on 
points of law and on the facts of the case.  If required, witnesses may be heard or re-heard 
and documents reviewed.  However, there are restrictions on introducing new evidence.  
Finally, the Federal Labour Court may hear appeals on points of law only against judgments 
given by Land Labour Courts.131 
There are clear themes which emerge from this analysis and which relate specifically 
to the discussion in this paper: a focus on meaningful early conciliation in order to try to 
preserve the social partnership and the clear involvement of the tripartite principle to provide 
robust dispute settlement methods, supported by strong enforcement mechanisms. 
 
                                                          
125 supra 
126Ministère de la Justice, France, ‘Présentation de l’ordre judiciaire’: http://www.justice.gouv.fr/organisation-
de-la-justice-10031/lordre-judiciaire-10033/ [Accessed 4 July 2016]. 
127 République et Canton de Genève, ‘Pouvoir Judiciaire, Justice et Tribunaux’: http://ge.ch/justice/tribunal-
des-prudhommes [Accessed 4 July 2016]. 
128 Bundesarbeitsgericht – Federal Labour Court, General Information: 






Re-envisioning dispute settlement in Scotland 
It is clear from the literature and recent reforms that the current dispute settlement measures 
are not necessarily fit for purpose.  For instance, the results of Busby and McDermont’s pilot 
study of Citizens Advice Bureau clients who attempted to access ETs in order to resolve their 
disputes, tentatively support the concern that current mechanisms are barriers to justice for 
the most vulnerable employees.132  It has also been widely recognised that ETs have become 
increasingly adversarial,133 and a move towards alternative dispute settlement mechanisms 
such as those more prevalent across Europe may help to restore the underpinning aims and 
purposes of Labour Law. 
In Scottish terms, an equivalent strategy to the Irish model would involve the merger 
of the functions of ACAS,134 HSE,135 HMRC136 minimum wage compliance officers and UKVI137 
control of illegal working, under one administrative branch.  This would have the advantage 
of being more efficient and cost-effective, although more significantly it would be a strategic 
way of ensuring compliance with all aspects of Labour Law.  This could be achieved by a 
reconceptualization of the role and function of ACAS, which has been identified by a number 
of commentators as a possibility, although how they envision this role differs.  One of the 
revised models mirrors the approach suggested here, which would see ACAS operating as the 
first point of entry in the dispute settlement process, in a way similar to the Irish Workplace 
Relations Commission.  Busby and McDermont identify two key, although at times competing, 
justifications for this approach.138  The first is based on the premise that ‘informalism is a 
more appropriate mechanism for dispute resolution’. 139   This reinforces the original 
underpinning aims of the ET system and is arguably most appropriate in the employment 
context, where the underpinning aim should still surely be to encourage and enable the 
                                                          
132 N Busby and M McDermont, ‘Workers, Marginalised Voices and the Employment Tribunal System: Some 
Preliminary Findings’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 166. 
133 S Corby and P Latreille, ‘Employment Tribunals and the Civil Courts: Isomorphism Exemplified’ (2012) 41 
I.L.J. 387, 398. 
134 Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service. 
135 Health and Safety Executive 
136 HM Revenue and Customs 
137 UK Home Office Visas and Immigration 
138 N Busby and M McDermont, ‘Workers, Marginalised Voices and the Employment Tribunal System: Some 
Preliminary Findings’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 166, 178. 
139 N Busby and M McDermont, ‘Workers, Marginalised Voices and the Employment Tribunal System: Some 
Preliminary Findings’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 166, 178. 
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employment relationship to continue following settlement of the dispute.  The second 
reflects the need to address ‘managerial demands for efficiency and value for money’.140  
While this should not come at the cost of maintaining and upholding labour law standards, a 
more cost-effective mechanism that enables both parties to reach an acceptable resolution 
to the dispute is undoubtedly worth pursing.  Busby and McDermont acknowledge that these 
justifications are often in tension, but it might represent a better balance between the 
interests of both parties than is currently possible.   
Having re-structured the entry point for all labour law disputes, the deployment of 
‘Mediation Officers’ and ‘Adjudication Officers’ along with a Labour Court broadly matching 
the present-day ET would mean that so many basic disputes could likely be resolved at the 
adjudication stage, freeing up the Labour Court (ET141) to deal with the more technical legal 
arguments presented by difficult cases.  This would mean that cases are heard more quickly, 
are more fully argued and quicker and better quality decisions ensue.  It could also mean the 
restoration of the ‘industrial jury’ principle and the tripartite principle – one employment 
judge sitting with one employers’ and one employees’, representative – to all employment 
cases and not only those with an Equality Act 2010 matter at issue.  It would also mean that 
more disputes could be resolved in a more informal manner using ‘Adjudication Officers’.  As 
noted previously, this would not operate in the same way as the current ‘early conciliation’ 
process, which has been subject to some criticism.  These critiques have focused on the 
underpinning rationale which is reducing costs and not improving workplaces, applying the 
legislation, or enhancing and/or resolving relations between employers and employees.142  A 
part of the problem here is the perceived partiality of the conciliation officers,143 as well as 
                                                          
140 N Busby and M McDermont, ‘Workers, Marginalised Voices and the Employment Tribunal System: Some 
Preliminary Findings’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 166, 178. 
141A suggestion would be to rename this body ‘The Employment and Equality Tribunal’, reflecting the two main 
statutory bases under which most claims are brought.  In fact, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction might arguably be 
extended to include those provisions of the Equality Act 2010 which are not presently justiciable in Tribunals 
e.g. education. 
142 Linda Dickens, ‘The Coalition government’s reforms to employment tribunals and statutory employment 
rights – echoes of the past’ ( 2014) 45 I.R.J. 234, 239 and 243.  Similar issues regarding their roles have been 
noted by N Busby and M McDermont, ‘Workers, Marginalised Voices and the Employment Tribunal System: 
Some Preliminary Findings’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 166, 181-183. 
143 As identified by N Busby and M McDermont, ‘Workers, Marginalised Voices and the Employment Tribunal 
System: Some Preliminary Findings’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 166, 179-181. 
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the pressures to resolve cases before they could proceed to ETs whatever the costs. 144  
Dickens argues that early conciliation could be much more meaningful and be used differently 
to not only help resolve disputes, but more importantly to improve the working environment 
so that such problems do not arise in the future.145  The use of ‘Adjudication Officers’ with 
decision-making powers would help to achieve this. 
With those reforms in place at grass-roots level, consideration would then have to be 
given to the question of whether it would continue to be necessary to preserve the EAT in 
Scotland but, instead, utilise the existing right of appeal into the Scottish courts structure, at 
the Court of Session Inner House level.  This would be an attractive option because the 
structure is already in place, and appeals are already possible via this route. 
In summary, the proposed approach to the design of a new Scottish Labour Law is in 
line with that taken by other mainstream European nations and is consistent with principles 
of EU Labour Law.  In addition, it would address some of the concerns with the current ET 
structure and fees regime as well as the underpinning objectives of labour law by reinstating 
some of the key characteristics of ETs and the settlement of disputes originally envisaged 
therein. 
 
Review of the industrial relations framework 
One of the distinctive features of the Scottish position, as compared with the rest of the UK, 
is the continuing significance of trade unions and social partnership in the context of industrial 
relations.  Despite the erosion of trade unions otherwise in the UK, Hepple has previously 
noted the importance of collective responsibility, particularly in light of the ‘decline in trade 
union strength and the fragmentation and shrinkage of collective bargaining’.146  This appears 
to be all the more significant in the current context of deregulation of individual employment 
rights achieved by the previous Coalition, and current Conservative, governments.   
The UK’s approach to collective bargaining is demonstrated by s.179 of the Trade 
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, which provides that:  
                                                          
144 N Busby and M McDermont, ‘Workers, Marginalised Voices and the Employment Tribunal System: Some 
Preliminary Findings’ (2012) 41 I.L.J. 166, 181-183. 
145 Linda Dickens, ‘The Coalition government’s reforms to employment tribunals and statutory employment 
rights – echoes of the past’ ( 2014) 45 I.R.J. 234, 244-245.  
146 Bob Hepple, ‘The Future of Labour Law’ (1995) 24 I.L.J. 303, 306.  This is reinforced by P Smith and G 
Morton, ‘New Labour’s Reform of Britain’s Employment Law: The Devil is not only in the Detail but in the 
Values and Policy too’ (2001) 39 B.J.I.R. 119, 134. 
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A collective agreement shall be conclusively presumed not to have been intended by 
the parties to be a legally enforceable contract unless the agreement— 
(a) is in writing, and 
(b) contains a provision which (however expressed) states that the parties 
intend that the agreement shall be a legally enforceable contract. 
 
It is true that, for the most part, trade unions themselves have been lukewarm (at best) to 
the idea of extending legal enforceability to collective agreements.  It is also true that, 
providing certain conditions are met, collective agreements may become legally enforceable 
by being incorporated into individual contracts of employment, either expressly 147  or 
impliedly.  However, the conditions under which implied incorporation may be upheld by a 
Court or Tribunal are extremely exacting evidentially for trade unions, involving issues such 
as: whether the parties ‘intended’ that it should be part of the individual contracts or not;148 
whether the term is apt for incorporation;149 whether the term of the collective agreement is 
a ‘term’ or ‘condition’ and therefore requires bilateral consent or entitles the employer to 
make unilateral changes;150 whether custom and practice applies.151  An informed bystander 
examining this from a neutral standpoint might be forgiven for thinking that the system is 
designed to make it as difficult as possible for collective agreements to become legally 
enforceable obligations, especially when one considers the unpredictability of success, the 
length of time, complexity, cost and legal fees (including ET fees) involved in instituting legal 
proceedings to enforce a collectively agreed term via an individual contract of employment.  
It is submitted, therefore, that the time is ripe for reform. 
In the earlier discussion in this paper of reform of the labour dispute settlement 
framework, the principles of tripartism, solidarity and social partnership were considered.  It 
is also important to consider these principles in the context of the law governing industrial 
relations, specifically, the law relating to collective bargaining.152  The further reforms in the 
                                                          
147 For example, Cadoux v Central Regional Council 1986 S.L.T. 117 
148 Shumba v Park Cakes Ltd A2/2012/3358; [2013] EWCA Civ 974 
149 Albion Automotive Ltd v Walker [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ. 946, 2002 W.L. 1446211 
150 Cadoux v Central Regional Council 1986 S.L.T. 117 
151 Henry v London General Transport Services Ltd [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ. 488, [2002] I.C.R. 910 
152 As stated earlier, a review of the law relating to industrial action is outwith the scope of this paper.  That is 
also a matter which requires to be addressed in the overall context of reform or re-design of Scottish labour law, 
however, it is submitted that the priority at this time is the discussion of potential collective bargaining 
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Republic of Ireland in this regard will first be considered, followed by a comparison with other 
EU partners and, finally, the implications for a devolved or independent Scotland will be 
discussed. 
 
Reforms in the Republic of Ireland 
In addition to the Workplace Relations Act 2015, the Irish Government has recently 
introduced the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015,153 which amends the existing 
Industrial Relations Acts 1990 and 2001. The Act entered into force on 1st August 2015.154  The 
recent Irish Government (2011- February 2016) which introduced both of these labour 
reforms was a coalition comprised of Ministers drawn from the Fine Gael party and the Labour 
Party.  As part of the negotiations between the parties with a view to agreeing a programme 
for government, the Labour Party, as the smaller party, secured a commitment from Fine Gael 
to reform aspects of Ireland’s industrial relations framework which had been shown to be 
fairly easily circumvented by the employers during the recent financial crisis.155  Another 
driver for reform was the further decision of the Irish Supreme Court in May 2013 in 
McGowan and others v the Labour Court, Ireland and the Attorney General.156  The Supreme 
Court in this case had declared the extension by a Government Minister of certain types of 
registered collective agreements to the whole sector to be unconstitutional, holding that, in 
terms of the Irish Constitution, only the Oireachtas (Irish legislature) is permitted to make 
laws and the extension of enforceability of a collective agreement to persons who were not 
parties to that agreement was a form of law-making which was outlawed by the 
constitution. 157   In the words of Gerald Nash, the Minister of State for Business and 
Employment, the main thrust of the new legislation is to:  
                                                          
approaches and the emphasis on prevention of industrial action through a clearer, more certain, more balanced 
and fair-minded approach to the negotiation collective agreements. 
153 Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015 (Number 27 of 2015). 
154 There were two Ministers responsible for steering the legislation through the Oireachtas (Irish legislature): 
the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation (Fine Gael) and the Minister of State for Business and 
Employment (Labour Party). 
155 See Ryanair v The Labour Court [2007] I.E.S.C. 6 where the Irish Supreme Court held that where an 
employer was engaged and negotiating with a staff association, employees could not refer a dispute to the 
Labour Court until all internal procedures had been exhausted.  This was viewed by Trade Unions as a serious 
limitation on their ability to engage in collective bargaining. 




‘bring a sense of certainty to both sides of industry who engage in such agreements 
around terms and conditions – particularly when the employer is tendering for 
contracts. Ultimately, I believe the legislation will improve industrial relations after a 
period of uncertainty.  It will also help to prevent a race to the bottom in terms of skills, 
training and terms and conditions of employment.’158 
 
There are two key provisions of the Act which will significantly alter the framework for 
conducting industrial relations negotiations in Ireland.  Firstly, the Act deals with the situation 
where there are no collective bargaining arrangements in operation, by providing a 
mechanism whereby workers, with the assistance of a trade union, or indeed an organisation 
of employers, may apply to the Labour Court to examine the terms and conditions of 
employment, including remuneration, for a specified type or group, based on comparisons 
with similar employers.159  A sectoral employment order may be reviewed by the Court, at 
the request of the Minister, after 3 years have elapsed.160  The effect of the Order is that it 
has the power to alter the terms and conditions of contracts of employment across the sector 
to which it applies.161  Secondly, where collective bargaining arrangements are already in 
operation, trade unions and employers will be able to apply to the Labour Court for 
registration of employment agreements which regulate terms and conditions within 
individual enterprises.  These agreements, when registered, will be legally binding and adapt 
the contract terms and conditions of those within its scope.162 This is a clear adoption by the 
Irish Government of the concept of extension of collective bargaining to ensure its 
effectiveness. 
It is submitted that the Irish proposed reforms represent a clear endorsement of the 
principles of tripartism, solidarity and social partnership.  The role of the state as facilitator is 
clearly set out, especially in terms of the judicial and executive functions, and the social 
partnership concept envisaged in Articles 152 and 155TFEU and Article 28 of the EU Charter 
                                                          
158 Stephen Rogers, The Irish Examiner, ‘Collective bargaining legislation unveiled’, 9th May 2015: 
http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/collective-bargaining-legislation-unveiled-329589.html [Accessed 4 
July 2016]. 
159 Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015 s.14.  The Labour Court may make a recommendation to a 
Minister under s.16, and the Minister may then issue a ‘sectoral employment order’ in terms of s.17.  
160 Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015 s.18 
161 Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015 s.19   
162 Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015 ss.8 and 11. 
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are also clearly defined.  Moreover, it is submitted that the proposals are compliant with 
Article 4 of ILO Convention No.98 which provides that:  
‘Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to 
encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary 
negotiation between employers or employers' organisations and workers' 
organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by 
means of collective agreements.’163 
 
Thus, the proposals also preserve the essence of voluntary collective bargaining which has 
always been a core principle of Irish industrial relations.164  It is important to consider how 
the Irish proposals sit with the approach to collective bargaining taken by other member 
states of the EU. 
 
 
Other EU examples 
In France and Germany, collective bargaining operates at national level, industry or sectoral 
level and company level.  In both countries, there is a long-established tradition of collective 
bargaining resulting in legally binding collective agreements; although the machinery for 
negotiation may be quite different the end results are the same, with agreements being 
legally enforceable.165  For example, one study conducted in 2013 revealed that, in France, 
98% of workers who were entitled to be covered by collective bargaining were covered by a 
collective agreement, and there was frequent use by the state of mechanisms for extension 
of applicability.  In Germany, the figure was 58% but with a more limited use of extension.  In 
                                                          
163 C098 Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain 
Collectively 1949 
164 McCann Fitzgerald, Briefing, ‘Important Industrial Relations Update – The Industrial Relations (Amendment) 
Act 2015’: http://www.mccannfitzgerald.ie/McfgFiles/knowledge/6371-
Important%20Industrial%20Relations%20Update%20-
%20The%20Industrial%20Relations%20Amendment%20Act%202015.pdf [Accessed 4 July 2016]. 
165 Udo Rehfeldt, ‘The French System of Collective Bargaining’, 29 August 2010, Social Europe: 
http://www.socialeurope.eu/2010/08/the-french-system-of-collective-bargaining/ [Accessed 4 July 2016] and 
Judge Annelie Marquardt, Richterin am Bundesarbeitsgericht, Bundesarbeitsgericht, Erfurt, paper presented at 
the XIVth Meeting of European Labour Court Judges 4 September 2006: 
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the UK, fewer than 30% of workers entitled to be covered by collective bargaining were in 
fact covered by collective agreements and extension was rarely, if ever, used166.  This study 
showed that there is a direct correlation between the use of extension mechanisms and 
collective agreement coverage:  the greater the use of extension, the higher the coverage of 
collective agreements.  The study also argues that high collective agreement coverage is a 
necessary part of ensuring a fairer distribution of wages and incomes and a more inclusive 
growth strategy for the economy. 
    One significant change that has occurred in both France and Germany over the last 
few years has been the ability of some company-level agreements to deviate from the 
industry-level agreement which was previously negotiated and governed industrial relations 
for the whole sector.167  In France, the state is more proactive at national level rather than 
industry or company level, with the social partners being involved in the development of 
legislation in the area of industrial relations, employment and training.168 
In Germany,169  there are provisions very similar to the proposed reforms in Ireland.  
A Minister of the Federal Government of Germany is permitted, subject to certain conditions, 
to declare a collective agreement which began life as a regional or sectoral agreement to be 
universally applicable. 170   Further, under legislation, a Minister may extend a collective 
agreement to sectors where there is no collective agreement in force, in order to deal with 
individual employers’ attempts to circumvent by resigning from employers’ federations to set 
lower pay rates, thereby driving down labour standards. 171   A further strong feature of 
Germany’s labour relations is the Works’ Councils which, although outwith the formal 
collective bargaining regime in respect of remuneration, have certain rights of co-
                                                          
166 T Schulten, L Eldring and R Naumann, The role of extension for the strength and stability of collective 
bargaining in Europe, ch.11 of Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance(ed. G an 
Guyes and T Schulten), published by the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), 2015.  This chapter was 
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167 Supra. Indeed, the recent industrial unrest in France in June 2016 stems from the French Government’s 
attempts at labour law reform by allowing greater flexibility for companies to deviate from large-scale 
collective agreements and to have greater powers to disregard clauses in agreements regarding pay and 
working hours in favour of their own local approach. 
168 ETUI, ‘Collective Bargaining’ Newsletter (ETUI 2014) http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-
Industrial-Relations/Countries/France/Collective-Bargaining [Accessed 4 July 2016]. 
169 Derived from the guarantee of freedom of association provided in Article 9 GG [Grundgesetz] 
170 ETUI, worker-participation.eu, Germany, Collective Bargaining: http://www.worker-





determination over matters such as disciplinary rules, breaks, overtime.172  In France, there is 
also a system of Works’ Councils, though their function is more to consult the workplace 
representatives rather than the German system of co-determination.173 
Tripartism and social partnership is also evident in Switzerland, where the federal or 
cantonal government has the power to declare collective agreements universally 
applicable.174  In Italy, the collective bargaining machinery is more haphazard but conforms 
to certain standards in regard to binding agreements once those have eventually been agreed 
or renewed e.g. minimum wage rates.175  It is submitted that it is clear from this analysis that 
there is a consistent and coherent approach in mainstream Europe to the role and regulation 
of collective bargaining.  The role of the state as facilitator of the social partners’ dialogue is 
clear and effective, giving full effect to the social partnership and tripartite principles.  The 
dichotomy between collectivism and individualism which has bedevilled UK Labour Law since 
the 1960s is, in the main, resolved whilst still preserving the essence of voluntary collective 
bargaining and maintaining a balance between both sides which is just and equitable. 
 
Implications for Scotland 
It is clear that the proposed reforms in the Republic of Ireland have set a course for an even 
closer alignment of that country’s industrial relations framework with mainstream European 
states in terms of the role and machinery of collective bargaining.  This is interesting because 
Irish labour law derives historically from a time prior to Ireland gaining independence from 
the UK in 1922 and, indeed, the similarities with UK law were to a large extent preserved until 
1990 when Ireland began to embrace a more European-style approach to industrial relations, 
including tripartism and social partnership, and a greater degree of regulation and 
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173 ETUI, worker-participation.eu, France, Workplace Representation: http://www.worker-
participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/France/Workplace-Representation [Accessed 4 July 
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Industrial-Relations/Countries/Italy/Collective-Bargaining [Accessed 4 July 2016]. 
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involvement of the state in facilitating collective bargaining. 176   Until the financial crisis, 
arguably, the success of the changed industrial relations framework was a factor in the 
emergence of the Celtic Tiger. 177   Once the crisis occurred, the natural inclination of 
employers – as in other states – was to seek to detach from the obligations of collectivism.  
Hence, the proposed reforms in order to strengthen the role of industrial relations in Ireland 
once again. 
What of Scotland? Should, and could, a Scottish Government bring about a similar 
change in approach to industrial relations through reform of the system of collective 
bargaining?  It is submitted that, from the earlier analysis of the present system operating in 
the UK, apart from its overriding uncertainty and ambiguity, it can be seen from judicial 
decisions that that favours business and employers to a large extent, a situation which is 
augmented in times of economic depression and financial austerity.  From a trade 
union/workers perspective, it may be argued that the present system has failed to maintain 
an appropriate balance between the competing interests of business and workers.  This is also 
further borne out, in varying degrees, in much of the academic commentary discussed 
previously. 
The erosion, deregulation and further retrenchment of UK labour law appears 
inevitable in the current political context.  This is reinforced in the Trade Union Act 2016, 
which received Royal Assent on 4th May 2016 but has not yet entered into force.  Arguably, 
this will further weaken the position of trade unions within the UK.178  It has been argued here 
that, if labour law were to be devolved to the Scottish Parliament, it would provide the 
opportunity for a re-envisioning of labour law and industrial relations that would better 
reflect and address Scottish ideals, and could return to its founding principles.   
 
The future of Scottish labour law: conclusions  
An integral component of any society is the world of work.  Work is a human activity which 
engages every one of us at some point in our lives and work is an essential component in the 
                                                          
176 National Social Partnership Agreements from 1987-2009 governed by Indsutrial Relations Act 1990.  See: 
ETUI, worker-participation.eu, Ireland, Collective Bargaining: http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-
Industrial-Relations/Countries/Ireland/Collective-Bargaining [Accessed 4 July 2016]. 
177 J Geary, Economic crisis, austerity and trade union responses: The Irish case in comparative perspective, 
2015 E.J.I.A., 1-17. 
178 As noted above at fn.100. 
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creation of a society’s wealth and prosperity.  Ensuring an appropriate balance between the 
rights and obligations under the law of those who hire labour and those who provide their 
labour is vital to the economic health and success of a society.  Therefore, the legal regulation 
of the relationship between employers and employees/workers is something which is of 
concern to society as a whole.  This of itself should provide sufficient justification for the 
involvement of the state in ensuring that there is machinery for collective bargaining and that 
it is fair and balanced, and that it is effective.  It is also, it is submitted, a fuller implementation 
of the provisions of the ILO Convention, the EU Treaties, and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.  It is also in the interests of both social partners: it is submitted that that much is 
evident from the comparison with collective bargaining systems in other EU states where 
productivity is generally higher.179  If the Scottish Government succeeds in gaining devolved 
powers for the Scottish Parliament over employment law and industrial relations, then the 
opportunity will exist to align Scotland more closely with European mainstream theory and 
practice, embracing principles of tripartism, solidarity and social partnership, creating a 
bespoke system of industrial relations fit for purpose in the 21st century and in tune with the 
national culture, needs and aspirations of Scots as evidenced at the outset of this paper. 
The two main areas identified for significant reform here, namely, the re-structuring 
of dispute settlement mechanisms and the revitalisation of the industrial relations 
framework, would re-focus labour law on the tripartite relationship, ensure solidarity through 
greater access to justice and resolution of employment disputes, and embed securely the 
concept of social partnership.  The experience in Ireland shows the importance of addressing 
these two pillars of labour law regulation together, to ensure a coherent system of industrial 
relations that is fit for purpose.  The wider experience throughout Europe also reinforces that 
a strong industrial relations framework can also enable the labour market to function more 
effectively.  It is only within the independent (in the broadest sense of the word) Scottish 
context that the future of Scottish labour law can develop on this distinctly different path and, 
hopefully, restore labour law to its well-established and recognised founding principles. 
                                                          
179 ILO Governing Body, International Labour Office, Committee on Employment and Social Policy, Collective 
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